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Vertical Crowdsourcing in Russia: Balancing Governance of Crowds and State–
Citizen Partnership in Emergency Situations 
 
Gregory Asmolov 
 
Crowdsourcing can be analyzed not only as a mechanism for empowerment, but also as 
operating a form of control over volunteers. This article applies Foucault’s notion of 
governmentality to examine relations between traditional governmental institutions and users 
of crowdsourcing platforms in Russia. Through a comparative analysis of two emergency 
volunteering portals, Dobrovoletz, and Rynda.org, we describe “vertical crowdsourcing” as 
a strategy by traditional (government affiliated) actors to use crowdsourcing platforms to 
govern and control volunteers. This is in contrast to horizontally organized, or ground-up 
understandings of crowd-volunteering platforms. Two alternative discourses around the role 
of crowd members are further discussed: volunteers as actors who can contribute resources 
to the achievement of a common goal, and the crowd as a threat to central government that 
needs to be controlled. 
 
Key Words: crowdsourcing, natural disasters, activity theory, governmentality, volunteering, 
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Background: The Emergence of Crowdsourcing in Russia 
 
“Crowdsourcing should become the norm at all levels [of government]”—these are the 
words of the Russian president, Vladimir Putin, taken from an article he published as part of 
his third presidential campaign (Putin, 2012). The story of crowdsourcing in Russia, 
however, started far from the Kremlin. The first major crowdsourcing platforms, created by 
groups of activists in order to address social challenges, appeared in 2010. In August 2010, a 
project called the Help Map for Victims of Russian Wildfires was developed by a group of 
volunteers, relying on the Ushahidi online platform. Another project, Rosyama, was 
introduced in the same year by a leading Russian activist, Alexey Navalny, in order to map 
potholes on Russian roads and force local authorities to fix the problem. Later, Navalny and 
his fellows introduced a number of additional crowdsourcing platforms, including Rospil 
(monitoring corruption) and RoskZhKH (monitoring local infrastructure). Another project, 
Liza Alert, used an online platform to mobilize Internet users for the search and rescue of 
missing people. 
The concept of crowdsourcing gained popularity in the Kremlin in 2011 during the 
presidential term of Dmitry Medvedev. A crowdsourced map of illegal casinos, Gdecasino.ru, 
introduced the first case where the government actively responded to a citizen crowdsourcing 
initiative. President Medvedev called the chief prosecutor and demanded the closure of all the 
illegal venues shown on the map, while criticizing the law enforcement service for lack of 
action in response to data coming from citizens (Litvinovich, 2011). 
In most of the cases, however, the authorities preferred to initiate development of their 
own crowdsourcing projects, rather than collaborate with existing citizen-based platforms. 
Russian official institutions introduced new crowdsourcing initiatives at the municipal, 
regional, and state levels. For instance, Dmitry Medvedev was associated with the 
development of the first state-affiliated crowdsourcing project, GdeDuraki.rf (“Where are the 
fools?”), which was supposed to collect reports from Russian citizens about the misbehavior 
of bureaucrats. It became evident that the tendency of the Russian government was not to 
respond to problems raised by citizen-based crowdsourcing projects, but to develop their own 
platforms. 
This polarization between citizen projects and state-affiliated platforms increased in 2011 
and 2012, around the time of the parliamentary and presidential elections, when the citizen 
crowdsourcing platform Karta Narusheniy (“Map of Violations”) was used for the 
monitoring of election violations and the crowdsourcing platform Beliy Krug (“White 
Circle”) was used for the coordination of protests in Moscow (Asmolov, 2013). While 
political activists tried to use crowdsourcing applications to map falsifications of the elections 
and challenge the authorities, crowdsourcing was also introduced as part of a new political 
program for the reform of Russian governance. At the same time, the authorities tried to 
restrict independent crowdsourcing projects. For instance, the nongovernmental organization 
(NGO) Golos, which launched the Map of Violations, was prosecuted, and the platform itself 
was blocked by Distributed Denial of System attacks on the day of the parliamentary 
elections in December 2011. 
This article examines the nature of the innovations introduced by traditional political 
institutions in response to challenges introduced by horizontal, bottom-up actors relying on 
digital technologies (Asmolov, 2013). It suggests an analysis of the development of 
crowdsourcing projects as part of the power relationship between grassroots formations and 
traditional institutions, relying on a case study of crowdsourcing for emergency response in 
Russia. 
On the theoretical level, the article explores what role digital tools, and in particular 
crowdsourcing platforms, can play in the governance of the resources of the crowd and how 
the struggle around crowdsourcing as a technique of power can lead to different implications 
for the structure of crowdsourcing projects. On the practical level, it seeks to offer an 
analytical framework that can facilitate reflexivity around the development of crowdsourcing 
projects and discusses how this can contribute to a synergy between institutional and 
individual resources. 
 
Defining Crowdsourcing 
 
Since Howe introduced the concept of crowdsourcing in 2006, there have been debates 
about “what crowdsourcing is and is not—strictly speaking” (Brabham, 2013, p. xix). 
Scholars disagree about the identity of the actors that participate in crowdsourcing, the nature 
of the relationship between these actors, and what crowdsourcing can be used for. The 
definition by Howe (2006) conceptualizes crowdsourcing primarily as a new business model 
that allows increasing profit for firms relying the outsourcing of tasks to “undefined networks 
of people.” 
Brabham (2008, p. 75) suggests a broader approach and defines the purpose of 
crowdsourcing as an “online, distributed problem solving and production model.” However, 
this definition still locates the understanding of crowdsourcing within a discussion about the 
efficiency, profit, and utilitarian aspects of information and communications technologies 
(ICTs). Brabham (2013) also challenges the definition of crowdsourcing as managed by 
institutional actors. He suggests that the locus of control over crowdsourcing can be either on 
the side of the organization or on the side of the community, although situations where “the 
organization is merely incidental to the work of the crowd” are not considered by Brabham 
(2013, p. 4) to be crowdsourcing. 
The nature of the resources that are mobilized is also disputed. Some researchers suggest 
(relying on Surowiecki, 2005) that what is mobilized is the “wisdom of crowds.” Others 
approach this as “crowd capital” (Prpic & Shukla, 2013). The discussion around the nature of 
the resources also differentiates between those used for simple mechanical tasks and those 
that can address complicated tasks (Petrick, Erickson, & Trauth, 2012), while simplistic 
forms of participation have been conceptualized by Zuckerman (2014, pp. 158–159) as “thin 
participation.” 
Comprehensive attempts by Estelles-Arolas and Gonzalez-Ladron-de-Guevara (2012, p. 
197) to analyze the majority of definitions have produced a notable generic conceptualization 
that emphasizes crowdsourcing as “online activity” with a variety of actors and a variety of 
methods. In addition, they emphasize the diversity of the contributions that can come from 
the crowd, including “work, money, knowledge, and/or experience.” This definition also 
suggests that crowdsourcing “always entails mutual benefit.” This, however, may be 
questioned by post-Marxist scholars who emphasize the role of crowdsourcing as a form of 
exploitation of digital labor that serves the interests of major commercial actors (Fuchs & 
Sevignani, 2013). That said, as Brabham (2008, p. 86) points out, “narratives from superstars 
in the crowd indicate more agency than Marxist critiques would allow.” The optimistic view 
suggests that crowdsourcing empowers grassroots actors and horizontal projects, while 
allowing the mobilization of the “cognitive surplus” for good (Shirky, 2010). It situates 
crowdsourcing within a normative dimension, as a mechanism of mutual aid (Benkler, 2011) 
and global goodwill (Meier, 2013). Following the notion of mass self-communication 
(Castells, 2007), one can argue that crowdsourcing suggests a mechanism for mass self-
mobilization. 
The disagreements as to whether crowdsourcing is another form of exploitation or a 
technological innovation that empowers the users of digital networks can be situated in a 
historical context. Efforts to mobilize the crowd are not a new thing. The state, as well as 
other actors, has always been interested in harnessing the power of volunteers and/or in 
forcing people to “volunteer.” A soldier of the Red Army points his finger toward the viewer 
on the famous poster from 1920 by Dmitriy Orlov captioned “Have you registered as a 
volunteer?” (Figure 1). In 2010, the same image was adopted in order to call volunteers to 
participate in response to wildfires through a crowdsourcing platform, the “Help Map.”1 The 
figure of a male soldier was replaced by that of a woman, with the same message and a link 
to the platform that facilitated citizen-based emergency response (Figure 1). The institutional 
mobilizer was replaced by an independent citizen engaged in bottom-up mobilization. 
 
                           Figure 1: Russian volunteering posters from 1920 and 2010. 
While control over the crowd has always been a part of the political agenda, the 
increasing role of ICTs can both provide new tools for harnessing the crowd and challenge 
the capacity of institutional actors to take the major role in the engagement of crowds. One 
can argue that digital mediation diminishes the requirement for institutional structures in 
order to mobilize crowds in light of what Bennett and Segerberg (2012) conceptualize as 
“connective action.” 
In light of what has been discussed above, the crowdsourcing definition adopted in this 
article seeks to address a number of challenges. First, it tries to avoid limiting the scope of 
actors, goals, or the structure of relationships and does not favor the role of any specific actor 
in this relationship. Second, it makes an effort to avoid focusing solely on the utilitarian 
aspects of crowdsourcing and allow an examination of power relationships. 
Following the conceptualization of the resources that can be mobilized by relying on the 
mediation of digital platforms as crowd capital (Prpic & Shukla, 2013), this article 
approaches crowdsourcing as the digitally mediated mobilization of resources of a networked 
crowd in order to achieve a particular goal. The resources that can be mobilized through 
crowdsourcing include sensor resources (e.g., for the purpose of monitoring and data 
collection), analytical resources (e.g., data mining), professional resources (relying on the 
specific expertise of an individual), physical resources (relying on the physical power of the 
individual), material resources (e.g., specific things/goods), and financial resources (e.g., in 
the case of crowdfunding). The scope of this discussion is also limited to the mobilization of 
volunteer resources, with no financial reward, meaning that crowdsourcing is approached as 
the digital platform-mediated mobilization of volunteers. 
A significant body of literature discusses the contribution of crowdsourcing to disaster 
response (Meier & Diane, 2009; Ziemke, 2012). The above definition allows us to argue that 
in the case of an emergency situation, a crowdsourcing application can be used for the 
mobilization of a variety of resources, from crisis mapping—which suggests the engagement 
of sensor resources (for data collection) and analytical resources (for data mining, curation, 
geolocation, and verification of data) as well as some expert resources (e.g., geographic 
information system)—to the mobilization of material power including humanitarian aid, the 
coordination of emergency operations, as well as the actual response on the ground, including 
fighting fires and participating in cleanup operations. 
This definition allows us to address two elements that require critical examination. The 
first is the subject of crowdsourcing, which means the individuals that constitute the 
networked crowd. The second is the nature of the resources mobilized through digitally 
mediated sourcing. Accordingly, the questions asked are: who can benefit from 
crowdsourcing, whose interests does it serve or threaten, as well as whether the emergence of 
crowdsourcing tools changes the balance of power relationships in specific fields. 
 
Theoretical Framework: Crowdsourcing as the Governance of Crowds 
 
The purpose of the theoretical framework presented here is to allow the critical 
investigation of crowdsourcing within a context of power relationships between state-
affiliated institutional actors, and actors that have no affiliation with the state. The article 
argues that a critical examination requires us to divide the concept of crowdsourcing into two 
parts: the “crowd” and the “sourcing.” The examination of the role of digital platforms in 
crowdsourcing is concerned with the “crowd” (as the construction of a “subject”) and with 
“sourcing” as a process of mobilization of the crowd’s resources, relying on mediation by 
ICTs. In this context, the purpose of critical analysis is to explore how the crowd is 
constituted through crowdsourcing techniques and what resources are mobilized by relying 
on digital mediation.  
In order to address this analytical goal, the crowd is conceptualized here as a subject of 
governance, relying on the notion of governmentality (Foucault, 1991). It can be argued that 
the development of information technologies (ITs) has contributed to the transformation of 
populations into networked crowds that are not bounded by geographical location. This has 
introduced new challenges for the governance of populations. The emergence of a networked 
crowd as a resource, and accordingly as a subject for regulation, suggests a necessity for the 
“governance of crowds.” 
Relying on Foucault’s notion of power and governance, we can therefore approach 
crowdsourcing as a technique of power that structures the “possible field of action of others” 
(Foucault, 1982, pp. 220–221). This structuring, however, can take place in different contexts 
of power relationships, with different degrees of individual freedom. While exploring how 
crowdsourcing platforms constitute the subject of crowdsourcing and how the resources of 
the crowd are managed, one may distinguish between crowdsourcing as a technology of self-
governance and crowdsourcing as a technology for the governance of others. 
According to Foucault (2007, 95), governmentality can be conceptualized as the state’s 
“supervision and control over its inhabitants, wealth, and the conduct of all and each, as 
attentive as that of a father’s over his household and goods.” He argues that the main subject 
of a power relationship is the possibilities of action by other people: “To govern, in this 
sense, is to structure the possible field of action of others” (Foucault, 1982, p. 221). 
According to Foucault (1993, pp. 203 204), governance does not necessarily mean a form of 
coercion or domination: 
 
(. . .) governing people is not a way to force people to do what the governor wants; it is always a versatile 
equilibrium with complementarity and conflicts between techniques which assure coercion and processes 
through which the self is constructed or modified by himself. 
 
Foucault (1988, p. 19) identifies three modes of power relationship that suggest various 
degrees of the subject’s capacity to take a part in defining his/her own conduct, from the 
“strategic games between liberties” that give more space to the manifestation of agency 
through “governmental technologies” to “states of domination” that suggest significant forms 
of restriction of the subject’s freedoms. This article suggests an analysis of crowdsourcing 
relying on a notion of governance as a technology of power applied by institutional, state-
affiliated actors in order to govern a crowd and its resources. It examines whether 
institutional actors take crowdsourcing from a state of strategic games toward a state of 
governance, and possibly a state of domination. 
Foucault (1991, p. 104) argues that “a governmental state, [is] essentially defined no 
longer in terms of its territoriality, of its surface area, but in terms of the mass of its 
population with its volume and density (. . .).” He links the notion of governmentality to the 
shift from protection of territorial sovereignty to the governance of subjects living within a 
territory. One can argue that the development of ICTs has contributed to the transformation 
of populations into networked crowds that are not bounded by geographical location.2 This 
has introduced new challenges for the governance of populations, due to the increased gap 
between populations and territories. The emergence of a networked crowd as a resource, and 
accordingly as a subject for regulation, suggests a necessity for the “governance of crowds,” 
while the emergence of digitally mediated sourcing practices has focused governance efforts 
on the resources of the crowd, including the governance of the “cognitive surplus” (Shirky, 
2010), as well as of digitally mediated volunteering. 
Finally, relying on Foucault’s notion of power and governance, crowdsourcing can be 
understood as a technology of power that structures the possible field of action of others. This 
structuring, however, can take place in different contexts of power relationships, either as a 
part of a strategic game around the mobilization of crowd resources or as a part of the 
governance of crowds and in particular the governance of networked volunteers, which can 
also potentially lead to a state of domination. While exploring how crowdsourcing platforms 
constitute the subject of crowdsourcing whose resources can be mobilized, one may 
distinguish between crowdsourcing as a technology of self-governance and as a technology 
for the governance of others. 
 
Conceptual Framework: Mapping the Discourse of Activity in Crowdsourcing Tools 
 
Despite being a productive theoretical framework, applying the concept of 
governmentality to the analysis of crowdsourcing presents a number of methodological 
challenges. Although Foucault discusses governmental technologies, his notion of 
technologies is vague and he does not discuss the role of ICTs. In addition, the notion of how 
the subject is governed relies on a number of concepts, including those of security, 
knowledge, and political economy, but does not suggest a specific methodological apparatus. 
Most of Foucault’s analysis of the construction of the subject relies on the investigation of 
discourses and is focused in particular on knowledge, classification, language, and semiotic 
systems, but not on ITs. Accordingly, what is required is a conceptual apparatus that allows 
us to explore how crowdsourcing tools constitute the crowd and govern its resources. 
The conceptual framework used here seeks to allow an investigation of what is governed 
and how it is governed. For this purpose, we turn to the notion, developed as a part of cultural 
historical activity theory (CHAT), of a tool-mediated, object-oriented activity and suggest 
focusing on activity as the major level of analysis (Leontiev, 1978). The basic assumption of 
CHAT is that the relationship of individuals with their surrounding environment is always 
mediated through artifacts. This notion was introduced by Lev Vygotsky (1978) through his 
depiction of a triangle in which the actions of a subject are always directed to a particular 
object while being mediated through an artifact. Kaptelinin and Nardi (2006, p. 56) argue that 
“the structure of a tool itself, as well as learning how to use a tool, changes the structure of 
human interaction with the world.” 
Accordingly, the role of crowdsourcing platforms in structuring the action of digital users 
can be approached as the mediation of an object-oriented activity that relies on a digital 
artifact. In the case of crowdsourcing platforms for emergency response, the subject is the 
volunteer and the object is the response to a disaster. The mobilization of the crowd’s 
resources is addressed as an activity within the context of a subject–object relationship, for 
example, the users of a mobile application (subject) who provide information about the 
disaster (object), or Internet users (subject) who go to the area of the disaster in order to fight 
the fire (object). Engestrom (1987) has suggested a model that identifies a number of 
additional components of the activity system, including rules, community, and division of 
labor. The conceptual framework for the investigation of crowdsourcing platforms presented 
here suggests conceptualizing these platforms as artifacts that mediate activity and give rise 
to activity systems (Figure 2). 
 
                      Figure 2. A Conceptual Framework for Analyzing Crowdsourcing Tools as Activity   
                                  Systems, Relying on Engestrom’s Model (1987). 
 
Figure 2 shows how Engestrom’s model can be applied to the analysis of a 
crowdsourcing tool as a mediated activity system: 
• Subject–object relationships as reflected through the metadata and structure of 
classification of the object: what resources need to be activated by the subject as a 
part of the relationship with the object. 
• Rules of activation: who is allowed to activate the resources of the subjects. 
• Community: what are the boundaries of the activated community 
(bounded/unbounded) and what are the membership requirements. 
• Division of labor: the structure of differentiation between the resources mobilized 
and the degree of integration between subjects that share various resources. 
  
Accordingly, applying CHAT allows us to argue that the activity of crowds is governed 
through mediation by digital platforms. Crowdsourcing platforms give rise to a specific type 
of activity system. Applying the notion of an activity system to the analysis of crowdsourcing 
platforms allows us to identify the “discourse of activity” mediated through the platform that 
manifests the relationship of power around the mobilization of the crowd’s resources. This 
should provide methodological tools for exploring how a crowdsourcing platform structures 
the field of action of others, as well as how it constitutes the subject of crowdsourcing. 
Framing the discussion of crowdsourcing as a technique of power that regulates the 
activity of crowds allows crowdsourcing platforms to be approached as a field of struggle 
where we may expect that institutional actors will use digital tools as a disciplinary 
framework for activity, while informal actors will try to use this opportunity to develop 
independent activity systems. Interviewing the developers and managers of a specific 
platform allows us to follow the development of the system, and the “genealogy of activity” 
with a focus on contradictions as a part of the development of the system. The following case 
studies seek to map the structure of activity systems that are mediated through digital tools 
and that aim to mobilize the resources of the crowd in emergency situations. This is followed 
by a discussion of the structure of activity systems as different forms of the digitally mediated 
“governance of crowds.” 
 
Case Study: Crowd Mobilization for Emergency Response 
 
General Overview 
 
The field of crowdsourcing projects for emergency response has a dual nature. On the one 
hand, in a case of natural disaster the major purpose shared by the majority of actors is 
responding to the disaster, including saving human lives and recovery. In the case of Russia, 
the volunteers organized spontaneously around crowdsourcing platforms and social media 
played a significant role in a struggle against wildfires in 2010 and floods in 2011 (Asmolov, 
2014a). On the other hand, as pointed out by Hewitt (1998, p. 90), one of the major concerns 
of state-affiliated actors can be related to the restoration of “all forms of regulation and 
enforcement of state power” disrupted by the power of nature. Pelling and Dill (2006) 
suggest that disasters create a stress test for political systems, and that state actors may 
approach spontaneous, citizen-based self-organization as a threat and respond to it with 
repression. 
The central case presented here is the government-affiliated Dobrovoletz.rf platform.3,4 
The portal was managed by RosSoyuzSpas, an organization of retired emergency response 
professionals affiliated with the Russian Ministry of Emergency Situations in order to engage 
volunteers in emergency response. It will be compared here with the citizen-based emergency 
response crowdsourcing platform Virtual Rynda: The Atlas of Maps (Rynda.org), a 
volunteering portal developed by an independent group of activists with the support of the 
same IT group that developed Dobrovoletz.rf. 
In the center of this comparative analysis, stand the two versions of Dobrovoletz.rf (the 
development concept and the final versions) and the nature of the transition from the initial 
project to the final version that was launched online. In light of this focus, the secondary case 
study (the citizen-led Rynda.org) has a supplementary role in helping to elucidate the nature 
of the platform’s transition and presenting an example of a platform that is closer to the initial 
concept of Dobrovoletz.rf, which was never implemented. Accordingly, the discussion of the 
Rynda.org project is less comprehensive. 
The analysis relies on two data sets collected as a part of a doctoral project undertaken by 
the author on the role of digital platforms in emergency response. The first data set is drawn 
from 35 semi-structured interviews conducted in 2013 with digital volunteers, official 
representatives of emergency organizations, and developers of emergency-related platforms 
in Russia. The second set is a database, built in 2013, of 20 emergency-related digital 
platforms in Russia. The data for this article addresses two specific projects that were 
represented in the database and the interviews. In the case of Dobrovoletz.rf, the interviews 
allow us to follow the shift from the initial (open and horizontal) concept of the platform to 
the final (closed and vertical) version of the platform implemented online. This is 
conceptualized as the “genealogy of activity.” 
A coding framework informed by activity theory (Figure 2) was developed in order to 
conduct a thematic analysis of the structure of activity systems in both case studies and to 
identify the discourses of activity that are mediated. In addition, a discourse analysis of 
interviews was conducted in order to explore the discourses around the role of volunteers in 
emergency situations and the potential value of the resources of the Internet users. 
 
The Structure of the Dobrovoletz Platform 
 
According to a statement on Dobrovoletz.rf, “The Dobrovoletz portal is a joint interactive 
information resource that seeks to unite all ‘dobrovoltzy’ and volunteers in Russia.” The front 
page of the Dobrovoletz portal suggests an appeal—“Become a volunteer”—with a link for 
registering as a member of the volunteer community, as well as two categories of updates, 
“Events” and “Humanitarian Actions” and general news (Figure 3). 
 
                            Figure 3: The online version of the front page of Dobrovoletz.rf. (June 2015)  
 
The homepage explains that once a user registers and identifies their skills, as well as 
preferences for volunteering, they will receive invitations to participate in volunteering 
programs and humanitarian operations coordinated in any region of Russia. The public-facing 
news is of a general nature, with a general description of what has happened and the location 
of the event on the map; the only way to get more information about specific activities of the 
volunteer community is to join. This requires the provision of information about the skills, 
certification, physical condition, and availability of the volunteer. If the potential volunteer 
has official certification as a rescuer or paramedic, they receive the status of professional 
rescuer, following a process of verification. In other cases, the volunteer receives the status of 
general volunteer.  
Once the volunteer is approved they have access, depending on their authorization, to the 
internal part of the website. The internal classification includes type of participant and list of 
events, as well as humanitarian actions. The pages in the “events” and “humanitarian actions” 
categories have no specific structure and can be filled with any type of text (although these 
pages are generally used for informing users about recent updates). The internal part of the 
site provides more detailed information about the emergency situations as well as about the 
people taking part in emergency response, the resources mobilized, and specific activities. It 
also allows responders to share information about their participation, including updates and 
photos from on the ground. That said, it is not used for the mediation of activity around 
emergency response, but only for providing information about activities that have already 
taken place. The structure of the internal section of the website supports sharing information 
with the registered users, but does not include specific categories for engaging members in 
emergency response. One could suggest that the internal structure of the website resembles 
the structure of traditional command and control systems, with lists of incidents and available 
resources. 
The structure of the website can be summarized in terms of three different audiences. The 
general public has access to the external page, with general news about emergencies and 
humanitarian events, and an option for registration as a volunteer. Logged-in members have 
access to more detailed and specific information about events and people associated with a 
particular emergency response. Moderators and administrators can contribute data, share 
requests, or directly activate members around a particular event, relying on information from 
the registration database. An ordinary member can contribute information about themselves 
and follow news and activities, but their capacity to engage is dependent on the website’s 
administrators. 
 
Actual Usage 
 
Interviewee D5, a representative of RosSoyuzSpas, the organization of retired emergency 
response professionals which manages the Dobrovoletz website, argued that the system 
allows them to reach out to all the registered users, using SMS, email, or Skype, with any 
type of information. The system divides volunteers into three groups: members of 
RosSoyuzSpas, professional rescuers/ certified volunteers, and general volunteers with no 
specific certification or skills. The task a person can be allocated depends on their skills and 
which group they belong to. The mobilization of volunteers through the platform takes place 
by decision of the executive committee of RosSoyuzSpas. Interviewee D suggested that the 
role of the platform is defined in accordance with Russian law: “The law says who and when 
should respond and the platform is embedded as a citizen rescue formation.” 
Dobrovoletz.rf was used in a response to floods in the Amur area in the Russian Far East 
in 2013. According to the interviews conducted, the platform was primarily used as an 
internal system for the exchange of messages and the sharing of photos, summary reports and 
general information. Interviewee D emphasized that all the people involved were “not just 
volunteers,” but “our people, who are prepared, trained, certified, and have all the right 
equipment.” According to Interviewee A,6 who initially developed the concept of 
Dobrovoletz.rf, during the floods the website was used solely by RosSoyuzSpas volunteers as 
an internal platform, although the initial idea was that the platform would be used not by a 
specific organization, but by all types of volunteers in Russia. 
 
Genealogy of Activity 
 
The interviews allow us to map the major contradictions in the development of the 
platform. The major actors around the development of the platform included a professional 
firefighter and activist who developed the initial idea of the platform (Interviewee A), 
software developers from an IT firm that developed the platform (Interviewees B and C), and 
the state-affiliated NGO “RosSoyuzSpas” that expressed its interest in supporting and 
administrating the platform (represented by Interviewee D). 
Interviewee A suggested creating a volunteer portal that would allow a community to be 
established not only for professionals but also for a more general group of volunteers. The 
platform was to be focused on the facilitation of a transparent process around specific needs. 
It was supposed to provide an infrastructure for horizontal connections and to allow users to 
create their own initiatives: 
 
The idea was that people would be able to create groups according to their volunteer interests while 
being able to define their personal skills and competencies for themselves. Accordingly, people could 
collaborate horizontally and independently in the groups that they would create relying on the platform, 
but they also could ask for help from other groups. (Interviewee A) 
 
The purpose of Dobrovoletz was therefore to enable a full picture of the human resources 
available for a response, and to manage those resources by relying on information about 
people’s skills, reputation, location, and availability. 
Following the development of the idea, RosSoyuzSpas, a major emergency response 
NGO that relies on volunteers, expressed an interest in the platform as a tool to improve 
volunteers’ engagement and management. RosSoyuzSpas and the IT group agreed on a 
partnership in order to implement the concept of Dobrovoletz. rf. Interviewee C7 argued that 
he had opposed the idea that the platform should be associated with a specific organization, 
while the initial plan had been to develop an environment where any group would have the 
power to manage itself. At the same time, the development of this environment was supposed 
to be supported by RosSoyuzSpas, which could collaborate with these groups if needed. 
However, the developers and the author of the idea argued that, from the point of view of 
RosSoyuzSpas, the major purpose of Dobrovoletz was to create a command and control 
system for a distributed network of certified volunteers. According to Interviewee C, 
“RosSoyuzSpas decided that if they can harness everything, they won’t give it to anyone else. 
(. . .) What they created is not volunteering, but their own small military.” 
According to the author of the concept (Interviewee A), the involvement of 
RosSoyuzSpas led to the “detachment of horizontal connections between the groups.” 
According to him, “RosSoyuzSpas wanted to have total control over the process and prevent 
the collaboration of nonsystem volunteers among them-selves.” Interviewee A argued that 
the reasons for the shift in the purpose of the platform was a fear of nonsystem volunteers as 
an entity that could not be controlled, as well as concerns that nonsystem volunteers might be 
more efficient than traditional organizations. 
One of the points of debate was also the degree of transparency around the information 
on Dobrovoletz. According to one of the developers (Interviewee C), he had demanded 
transparency around activity facilitated through the platform, including information about 
who had asked for help, what help was required, and who had offered their help: 
 
Almost all volunteers say that they are ready to help, but they want it to be transparent. They don’t 
want to be just people that get tasks and do the work that other people get paid for, but they want the 
Dobrovoletz portal to be precise, clear and transparent in order to understand the tasks on our agenda, 
our contribution, and why it’s needed. But that element is missing. (Interviewee C) 
 
According to Interviewee D, the representative of RosSoyuzSpas, they had considered 
making the platform more transparent, but then decided to cease these efforts because 
information from the area of an emergency could be used by the mass media. As a result, it 
was decided that the only element of the activities of the platform to be visible to the public 
would be general news. 
One of the developers of the platform (Interviewee B)8 suggested that, while the declared 
purpose of the platform was the integration of professional and spontaneous volunteering 
resources around an emergency situation, once RosSoyuzSpas started to play a central role in 
the development of the platform its real purpose became to create a technological component 
of a legal framework that sought to regulate volunteering in Russia. According to a 
representative of RosSoyuzSpas, the system had been created in order to allow the 
monitoring of an individual volunteer’s activity: 
 
Sooner or later the ‘Law of Volunteering’ will be approved, and then we will have to register all 
volunteering activities. Accordingly, we thought, how should we do this? This personal card [for 
volunteers] is going to rely on some type of memory card and will use card readers, or we can do it on 
paper as a resume, or make a passport for volunteering, and eventually we decided to go with the idea of 
the platform.9 (Interviewee D) 
 
One of the developers (Interviewee C) concluded: “Our initial idea was to make this 
platform as a tool for the integration of volunteer resources, but you see, it didn’t work. There 
is zero integration.” 
 
Clash of Discourses and Regimes of Control 
 
The interviews with representatives of state-affiliated emergency response organizations 
allow us to identify a number of discourses around the role of independent volunteers, who 
can be considered as a subject of the activity system mediated through the platform. 
Interviewee A differentiated between the two main types of volunteer in Russia—system 
volunteers, who are affiliated with traditional emergency response institutes, and nonsystem 
volunteers—various groups of citizens who self-organize in order to respond to emergencies. 
Some of the representatives of official emergency services argue that the difference can be 
expressed through language, pointing out the difference between two synonyms: 
“dobrovoletz” (a word with Russian origins) and “volontyor” (a Russian word with Latin 
origins): 
 
‘Dobrovoletz’ is a person who is taken into account. He is registered according to the law. ‘Voluntyor’ – 
it’s like I will go and be a volunteer. The person can be whoever he is – a doctor, a policeman. But 
‘dobrovoletz’ is not like that – he will only follow orders. (Interviewee F)10 
 
One of the major discourses to be found in the way that the system volunteers talk about 
nonsystem activists concerns the degree of expertise: “I don’t want to offend these people 
and hurt their feeling but a yard keeper cannot work in an operating room and carry out 
surgery even if he wants to” (Interviewee D). Interviewee D further argued that the 
involvement of nonsystem volunteers should be limited to specific tasks that do not require 
training and skills: “They can manage information support well, giving out leaflets, talking to 
people.” 
Another type of discourse suggests that outside interests drive nonsystem volunteers. 
Interviewee D suggested the term “PR-volunteer” to describe people who want to use 
emergency situations to promote themselves and improve their own image through 
emergency-related activity on social networks, as well as to receive political benefits: 
 
Once something happens some kinds of civic activist come to the area, start posting photos on Facebook: 
‘we are in the ruins, we are with an old lady, we are there.’ (. . .) They get more followers and use the 
emergency to expand their audience. (Interviewee D) 
 
Accordingly, Interviewee D argued that professionalism means keeping a distance from 
politics: “Those people who are involved in politics can do whatever they want, and do their 
political stuff while collecting points among the ruins, but that is not our story.” 
At the same time, the volunteers expressed their lack of trust in and lack of desire to 
collaborate with platforms like Dobrovoletz that are affiliated with official emergency 
response institutions. Interviewee E,11 one of the coordinators of an online community of 
volunteer firefighters, explained why her fellow volunteers hesitated to engage with state-
affiliated initiatives: 
 
Once you are on the register, you have been counted, you feel committed. But those volunteers that I 
have been in touch with give a very high value to their feeling of freedom: I go if I want; I won’t go if I 
don’t want. (Interviewee E) 
 
Interviewee E explained that volunteers will not collaborate with state-affiliated 
platforms, as these initiatives do not allow them to participate in firefighting, while they are 
interested in taking an active role in response to an emergency. 
 
 
Virtual Rynda: The Atlas of Help 
 
 
                                 Figure 4. The Atlas of Help homepage, March 2013. 
 
The IT company that developed Dobrovoletz also supported the development of another 
platform aimed at facilitating the engagement of volunteers. Virtual Rynda: The Atlas of 
Help (Rynda.org) was developed as the second stage of the Help Map for Victims of Russian 
Fires (Russian-fires.ru) project (2010), which relied on the Ushahidi platform (Figure 4).12 
The Help Map sought to support the efficient allocation of resources through providing 
an infrastructure for direct horizontal communication between people in need and those 
willing to help them (Asmolov, 2014a). The idea of the Atlas of Help was to expand the 
facilitation of resources between those in need and those interested in helping beyond the 
situations of natural disasters. Anyone could post a request for help or an offer to share a 
particular resource. The service helped to create a match between the request and the most 
relevant available resources (Asmolov, 2014b). Unlike in the case of Dobrovoletz, the 
facilitation of help took place in an open and transparent mode where information was 
available to anyone. Whether or not to take part in the response to a particular request was a 
decision for users, and not for an administrator. The role of moderators was not the top-down 
activation of users, but to support the efficiency of horizontal communication. Access to 
information did not require registration. 
According to one of the developers (Interviewee B), there were substantial differences 
between the ways the two platforms engaged volunteers. Dobrovoletz was focused on the 
creation of groups of rescuers around specific events and on adding volunteers to these 
groups in case they were required. However, 
 
The purpose of Rynda was a provision of targeted direct help. I visit the website and say: ‘I have a 
problem of clothing, I don’t have enough clothes for my children.’ Anyone who has clothes can see this 
and help me. (Interviewee B) 
 
Both Dobrovoletz and Rynda.org were developed in order to engage volunteers, however, 
the ways in which the two platforms have achieved this goal have differed substantially. In 
the case of Dobrovoletz, information is restricted, access to information is associated with the 
type of membership within the community, and the decision to engage volunteers is of a top-
down nature and made by the leaders of RosSoyuzSpas. In the case of Rynda, the structure of 
the platform and of information about needs is transparent, access does not require any form 
of membership and users decide for themselves if they are interested in responding to a 
specific request. In addition, in the case of Dobrovoletz, needs are also defined solely by the 
administrator, while in the case of Rynda the requests come from the users of the platform. 
In other words, while Dobrovoletz suggests a top-down, hierarchical system of 
engagement in emergency response with strict requirements concerning what is needed in 
order to become a member of the community, Rynda offers an open system of engagement 
that relies on the facilitation of horizontal, peer-to-peer connections around the provision of 
help, participation doesn’t require member-ship, any specific skill set or verification, and the 
terms of participation are defined by the users. 
 
Analysis 
 
Both projects under investigation, Dobrovoletz and Rynda.org, are approached here as 
artifacts that mediate the activity of volunteers around emergency response and that give rise 
to a particular type of activity system around emergency situations. The analysis 
demonstrates how the structure of the activity system mediated through the online platform 
regulates the activity of the subject, who in this case is the volunteer. The data collected in 
the interviews with the developers and the administrators of Dobrovoletz demonstrates the 
shift in the purpose and structure of the platform between the initial concept and the actual 
online implementation of the project. Applying an activity framework (Engestrom, 1987) 
allows us to conceptualize the transformation of the idea of the project as the transformation 
of an activity system: 
• Subject–Object relationship: In the case of Dobrovoletz, the subjects are the 
volunteers (the users of the platform), while the object is the response to disaster or 
any type of purpose that requires volunteer resources. The relationship between 
subject and object can be described in terms of the capacity of the subject to define 
the object of their activity or at least to choose the object within a particular 
activity system. The initial idea for Dobrovoletz.rf suggested that the object of 
activity would be defined by relying on the interests of independent groups that 
used the platform, and that this could be launched as a grassroots initiative. 
Eventually, in the case of Dobrovoletz, the objects came to be defined in a top-
down manner by the platform administrators, while the subject had no freedom to 
select a specific object from the range of objects within the activity system, or to 
have any impact on the definition of the object.  
• Community: The initial idea for Dobrovoletz.rf suggested that the platform would 
provide a framework for an unbounded open community with many independent 
volunteering groups, where the individual activists would launch the groups. The 
capacity to open a new group was not restricted. The platform was supposed to be 
used by professional responders to engage with a wide community of independent 
groups in order to integrate system and non-system resources as part of emergency 
response. Eventually, however, the platform came to suggest a community that 
relies on three groups arranged hierarchically: members of RosSoyuzSpas, certified 
rescuer-volunteers, and general volunteers. There was no option to open any 
additional groups. The community could now be described as a bounded group of 
approved users managed in a top-down manner by the administrators. 
• Division of labor: The initial idea of the Dobrovoletz.rf project suggested that any 
group could define their own set of objects according to their own interests. 
Accordingly, the mobilization of resources around these objects would take place 
within these independent groups among their own members, and could be 
described as flexible and bottom-up, relying on the interests of the subjects in 
participating in a particular task. That said, the major contribution of the platform 
was supposed to be the provision of a framework that would allow the integration 
of the skilled and unskilled resources of system and non-system volunteers into one 
activity system in response to emergency, and define a division of labor between 
various groups around the same object. Eventually, the platform came to suggest a 
model where the administrator would define the division of labor in a top-down 
manner, while the tasks of uncertified volunteers became limited (“thin,” to use 
Zuckerman’s (2014) term).  
• Rules: One aspect of the rules governing crowdsourcing platforms concerns the 
question of who is allowed to engage and when, or, to use activity theory 
terminology, the activating of volunteers. In the case of the initial Dobrovoletz 
project, we could see a high degree of flexibility around the terms of activation, 
where any group could use the platform in order to engage their members 
independently, without any request to and/or authorization from the administrators 
of the platform. The Dobrovoletz project in its current form suggests a platform 
that allows the activation of members only by decision of the administrator. 
What is also evident from the data is the substantial difference between the degree of 
transparency around objects, rules, information about members of community, and division 
of labor in the two versions of the project. The initial project suggested a high degree of 
transparency, while the final version has restricted access to most information. 
The initial version of Dobrovoletz and the final version administered online by 
RosSoyuzSpas therefore suggest two substantially different activity systems, while having 
the same subject (volunteers) and the same object (emergency response and humanitarian 
aid). To some extent, the structure of the activity system of the first version of Dobrovoletz 
recalls the structure of activity of Rynda.org, which offered full transparency and allowed the 
subject to define/ choose objects of activity, as well as suggesting a flexible division of labor, 
an unbounded community, and rules allowing the self-activation of the subject around a 
specific object. 
That said, the initial versions of Dobrovoletz and Rynda.org also differed substantially. 
The core idea of Dobrovoletz was the development of a community that could later be 
activated. The difference between the two versions of Dobrovoletz.rf; however, lay in 
whether these were to be independent communities that can be initiated by any user of the 
platform or communities bounded, defined and approved by the administrator. Unlike 
Dobrovoletz, Virtual Rynda suggested a direct mediation of activity through the publication 
of a request for help that could be addressed by individual users (Table 1). 
 
Table 1. Comparison of the Structure of the Crowdsourcing Platforms as Activity Systems. 
 Dobrovoletz.rf (initial 
version) 
Dobrovoletz.rf 
(final version) 
Rynda.org 
Subject–
object 
relationship 
The object is defined by 
independent groups of 
subjects 
The object is defined by 
the administrators of the 
platform 
The object is defined 
by the subject 
Rules Flexible: Independent 
groups can self- activate  
Strict: Only platform 
administrator can 
activate 
Flexible: Self-
activation by the 
subjects 
Community Bottom-up bounded: 
Every independent 
group defines its own 
boundaries 
Top-down bounded: 
The boundaries of 
community are defined/ 
classified by 
administrators 
Unbounded: The 
community relies on 
independent subjects 
Division of 
labor 
Bottom-up: Every group 
defines the structure of 
its own division of labor 
Top-down: The division 
of labor is defined by 
the administrators 
Bottom-up: The 
division of labor 
relies on subjects’ 
self-organization  
 
An integration of CHAT with the notion of governmentality allows us to bridge 
theoretical gaps and achieve a better understanding of the role of digital tools in the 
governance of crowds. The analysis presented here suggests how the system initially 
proposed by an emergency activist (Interviewee A) as a mechanism for the mobilization of 
resources through the facilitation of horizontal connections was transformed into a system 
mediating the top-down, vertical mobilization of resources by a specific actor who controls 
the system. 
This investigation demonstrates the tension between crowdsourcing applications as 
platforms that mediate the efficient allocation and integration of resources, and platforms that 
mediate control over resources and that eventually suggest a system of command and control 
over the crowd’s resource. While one can question whether a hierarchical structure for 
harnessing crowd resources can still be conceptualized as crowdsourcing, the definition of 
crowdsourcing adopted in this article suggests that these types of projects should still be 
considered as a digitally mediated mobilization of the crowd’s resources around a specific 
purpose. 
In light of the argument that the structure of mediated activity reflects a particular state of 
power relationship, it can be argued that crowdsourcing platforms mediate different 
discourses of activity around the volunteer as a subject and the crowd as a community of 
subjects within a specific activity system. The first discourse can be conceptualized as a 
discourse of “optimization of resource mobilization,” relying on the crowd. It constitutes a 
crowd as a resource that can support the achievement of a particular object by relying on the 
use of a digital platform. The second discourse is one that situates the role of the platform as 
a tool for “control of the crowd.” In this case, the subject and the crowd constitute a threat to 
state-affiliated institutions and have to be controlled. 
The case studies presented here illustrate how crowdsourcing platforms govern in 
different ways the “possibilities of action by other people” as conceptualized by Foucault. 
However, we can identify different models of power relationship around the digitally 
mediated governance of crowds. On the one hand, crowdsourcing platforms allow the subject 
to “construct the self” through active participation in terms of how the “resource of the self” 
is used. On the other hand, we can see how the institutional actors affiliated with state actors 
are seeking to use crowdsourcing platforms as a technique of power to regulate and control 
the self and the crowd as a resource. Relying on the Foucauldian differentiation between 
different modes of power, the genealogy of Dobrovoletz can therefore be conceptualized as a 
transition from a “game between liberties” around what is the most efficient form of 
resources mobilization, toward a situation of domination where crowdsourcing tools are used 
to command and control the crowd’s resources. 
We argue here that a technology of governance that suggests the activity discourse of 
“control over resources” can be conceptualized as vertical crowdsourcing. A notion of 
vertical crowdsourcing proposes that the structure of activity is defined by the institutional 
actor, with no space for the influence of agency on the system’s structure. In this case the 
purpose of the system, the boundaries, the rules, the right to participate in the community, 
and the division of labor are dictated by the agent who created the platform. In many cases 
the purpose of this type of activity system is primarily to control the activity of the crowd and 
to neutralize the potential for independent forms of activity. 
The evidence presented here suggests that the main purpose of tools like Dobrovoletz is 
not the engagement of people in response to an emergency or collaboration between the 
emergency services and spontaneous volunteers, but primarily the controlling of volunteer 
resources. Lack of transparency around the protocol of activation and a vertical hierarchical 
structure of activation suggest that this platform is allowing the institutionalization of 
resources without necessarily using those resources, while the registered volunteers have no 
control over when they can be activated or over the form of their engagement. 
One can suggest that in this case, the actual intention of the platform is the mediation of 
the passivity of those who are not affiliated with the state-affiliated institutions. On the one 
hand, the platform is created as a tool for the mediation of activity of volunteers in response 
to disaster, including citizens who have no official affiliation with the emergency response 
organizations. On the other hand, the vertical structure allows the activation of particular 
resources (e.g., unaffiliated nonsystem volunteers) to be avoided within the top-down 
structure of the division of labor. As a consequence, the volunteers are registered as a part of 
the system, but they don’t play any role in response to the emergency and remain passive. For 
instance, when the floods happened in eastern Russia in 2013, the platform was used by 
members of RosSoyuzSpas simply as an internal management tool, while nonsystem 
volunteers remained beyond the range of activation. 
The mediation of “thin participation” (Zuckerman, 2014)—that is, being able to suggest 
simple tasks without being given an opportunity for participation in more meaningful 
activities—can also be approached as a form of vertical division of labor that seeks to remove 
non-system volunteers from the core of activity.  
To conclude, we identify three elements of “vertical crowdsourcing”: 
• Top-down definition of the structure and purpose of crowdsourcing applications.  
• Embedded passivity: limiting the scope of forms of participation through the design 
of the structure of the application. 
• Non-transparency of activity: the structure of participation in the crowdsourcing 
application is not transparent to the user, who has no control over the form of their 
engagement.  
 
The idea of “vertical crowdsourcing” resembles what has been called “Putin’s vertical of 
power,” where the range of the vertical extends from various layers of government to the 
citizens. As a political strategy, vertical crowdsourcing seeks to achieve three major goals: 
1. To harness crowd resources in order to achieve the state’s goals.  
2. To neutralize independent crowdsourcing resources, prevent self-organization and the 
emergence of independent collective action. 
3. To create a semblance of participation, a facade of transparency and accountability. 
 
All that said, one could suggest that a vertical structure of activation of spontaneous 
volunteers, in the case of volunteering portals, creates contradictions between the form of 
management and the nature of the resource, which leads to the emergence of alternative 
activity systems.  
The interviews conducted with emergency response officials in Russia demonstrate that, 
from the state’s perspective, the emergence of “non-system” volunteers as powerful actors 
has been approached as a threat to the image of state institutions, as well as to the capacity of 
the state to keep monopoly control over crisis situations. Accordingly, people linked to 
traditional institutional actors approach volunteers not as a resource, but primarily as a threat 
that needs to be regulated, which is conceptualized as a discourse of control over crowd 
resources. On the other hand, the discourses of volunteers concerning the emergency services 
emphasize the lack of trust in the state-affiliated actors. In this situation, the digital tools 
created by volunteers seek to mediate an independent activity system that will be freed of the 
control of institutional actors and able to facilitate the activation of resources without state 
regulation.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Following the introduction of the crowdsourcing concept by Howe in 2006, the 
emergence of crowdsourcing practices and platforms has been approached by scholars with 
mixed assessments of this phenomenon. Conceptualizing crowd-sourcing as a technology of 
power demonstrates that crowdsourcing is a field of collision between different discourses of 
activity that deal with the construction of the “crowd” and the meaning of “sourcing.” 
This article has presented a theoretical, methodological, and practical contribution to the 
discussion of crowdsourcing. On the theoretical level, it introduces the concept of the 
“governance of the crowd,” which allows us to conceptualize crowdsourcing as a field of 
struggle taking place between the actors who want to govern the resources of the crowd, and 
the members of the crowd who are interested in keeping control over the mobilization of their 
own resources and in maintaining an equal relationship with traditional institutions. From the 
institutional point of view, the emergence of crowdsourcing practices creates a dilemma. On 
the one hand, institutions can benefit from the additional resources of a crowd. On the other 
hand, the emergence of the crowd as a powerful actor threatens the capacity of traditional 
institutions to preserve a high degree of control over a situation. Accordingly, while both 
traditional actors and the members of a crowd can benefit from the development of 
crowdsourcing practices, the real outcome depends on whether the institutional actors choose 
to use these tools to integrate the crowd’s resources or to contain them. While responding to 
this, challenge does not necessarily mean focusing only on the synergy or control of 
resources, finding a balance between controlling and using the resources of the crowd 
continues to be a major dilemma for policymakers. 
On the methodological level, the article allows us to conceptualize the role of ICTs in the 
mobilization of resources as an object-oriented activity mediated through digital tools, where 
the tools give rise to a particular form of activity system. The framework for this analysis of 
crowdsourcing platforms as activity systems as well as the three elements of vertical 
crowdsourcing outlined above also make a practical contribution to policymaking. They 
allow us to identify situations where crowdsourcing projects are created with a primary goal 
of controlling the crowd—and where the engagement of crowd resources in order to achieve 
a common goal and increase the efficiency of resource mobilization has a secondary 
importance, and can therefore be used as a rhetorical facade in order to conceal the real 
intention. Accordingly, this article seeks to contribute to and inform the reflexivity of actors 
developing crowdsourcing projects. 
The policy recommendations address a dilemma that commonly faces crowdsourcing 
projects with an institutional affiliation, and in particular projects initiated by state-affiliated 
organizations that seek to integrate the resources of the crowd with the resources of 
institutions, or to use the resources of the crowd for institutional purposes. On the one hand, 
while seeking to harness the crowd’s resources, the traditional institution wants to maintain 
control over the crowd and the purpose of its resource mobilization. On the other hand, the 
top-down management of crowd resources and applying a hierarchical logic toward the 
implementation of a crowdsourcing project may lead to rejection by a crowd that resents 
being harnessed. 
Accordingly, policy recommendations should address the question of how to maintain the 
sensitive balance between the desire to control resources and the need to develop a horizontal 
partnership with external actors, while providing a space for the members of the crowd to 
manifest their agency. The use of crowdsourcing platforms for the coordination of 
institution–citizen partnerships and the mediation of synergy, without trying to co-opt the 
crowd relies on five principles: 
1. Structure of subject–object relationships: crowdsourcing projects should allow 
the subject of crowdsourcing (the crowd) either to participate in the definition of 
the object of crowdsourcing, or to select a specific object for the application of the 
resources. The administrators of the platform should be open to addressing the 
questions raised by the crowd and to revising the object of crowdsourcing as a 
result of interaction with the crowd. In other words, the structure of the platform 
should allow some degree of manifestation of crowd agency in the purpose of 
crowdsourcing and in the forms of crowd participation for the achievement of this 
purpose. 
2. Community boundaries: The structure of the potential community whose 
resources are mobilized in order to address a crowdsourcing object should include 
a number of properties and combine these properties as a part of the 
crowdsourcing project. First, the community may rely either on individuals or on 
groups. Second, the community may be either bounded or unbounded. Third, the 
boundaries of communities may either be defined by an administrator, or emerge 
from the bottom, self-organize and preserve their independence by relying on 
group leaders. While all these strategies may be combined, finding the right 
balance between top-down management (and the restriction of community 
structures) and allowing the bottom-up emergence of community structures must 
play a key role in the successful synergy of resources. 
3. Division of labor: The structure of the division of labor within the community of 
a specific crowdsourcing platform should avoid the mediation of thin participation 
and/or of community members’ passivity. Any division of labor should allow a 
range of meaningful options for participation in crowdsourcing activity, although 
the definition of meaningful participation in crowdsourcing has a constructed 
nature and may be associated with the expectations of potential participants.  
4. Rules of activation of the crowd, as well as the structure of decision-making and 
the identities of stakeholders (either top-down, or relying on local communities), 
should be clear to all members of the community around a crowdsourcing project.  
5. Transparency: all the elements of the structure of a crowdsourcing platform, 
including its objects, community boundaries, division of labor and rules of 
activation, should be fully transparent to all the participants, accountable, and 
open to revision. 
 
Although these findings rely on data collected in Russia, which has a specific political 
system, the analysis presented here holds value for any country. While the way digital tools 
are used by Russian institutional actors can be skewed toward efforts to maintain full control 
of crowd resources—and we can also see a significant polarization between state-affiliated 
and citizen-based crowdsourcing projects—what happens in Russia still presents one of the 
forms of the struggle over the crowd’s resources that can be conceptualized through the 
notion of governmentality. The “governance of the crowd” dilemma of being caught between 
the desire to control the crowd and the intent to find an efficient strategy for mobilizing the 
crowd’s resources can be found in different political systems. Future research should allow us 
to analyze the structure of activity systems mediated through crowdsourcing projects in 
countries with different political systems and different degrees of political freedom. 
 
Gregory Asmolov, M.A., Ph.D. Candidate, London School of Economics, London, UK [e-
mail: g.asmolov@lse.ac.uk]. 
 
 
Notes 
1. Poster (2010) by Maria Zhalnina (http://design.zhalnina.com/#posters) used by kind 
permission of the designer. 
2. One of the most notable arguments in this regard has been made by Manuel Castells 
in his concept of the “space of flows.” 
3. “Dobrovoletz” means volunteer in Russian, the literal translation being “a person with 
free will.” A synonym of “dobrovoletz” commonly used in Russian is “volontyor.” 
4. The platform is located in the Cyrillic domain. The actual URL of the platform is 
доброволец.рф 
5. Interviewee D. A representative of RosSoyuzSpas. Interview by the author. Audio 
recording. Moscow, September 12, 2013. 
6. Interviewee A. An author of the Dobrovoletz.rf idea, professional firefighter, and 
emergency activist. Interview by the author. Skype recording. December 11, 2013. 
7. Interviewee C. A head of team in the IT company that developed Dobrovoletz.rf. 
Interview by the author. Audio recording. Moscow, September 3, 2013. 
8. Interviewee B. A senior manager in the IT company that developed Dobrovoletz.rf. 
Interview by the author. Audio recording. Moscow, August 31, 2013. 
9. The project of the law N 300326-6 “About Volunteering” was submitted for 
consideration of the Russian Duma on June 21, 2013. The project was sent for revision. 
According to the official website of Russian Duma in June 2015 the project of the law was 
still under consideration: http://asozd2c. 
duma.gov.ru/main.nsf/%28Spravka%29?OpenAgent&RN=300326-6. 
10. Interviewee F. A former official of the Ministry for Emergency Situations in the 
Moscow region. Interview by the author. Audio recording. Moscow, August 31, 2013. 
11. Interviewee E. A moderator of an online volunteer firefighting community. Interview 
by the author. Audio recording. Moscow, August 30, 2013. 
12. The author of this article took part in the development of the Virtual Rynda platform. 
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